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censor acquires, and thereby extends his control to, rights
which were not granted within the four corners of the patent.
It is not the fact of control but what is controlled and how
control was established that are relevant. Therefore, the
mere fact that control is extended quantitatively cannot be
an invalidating consequence of this license.
It is apparent that the license in suit would necessarily
have certain consequences which are arguably adverse to
the public interest. These consequences, arising as they do
from the existing patent system rather than from this par-
ticular license, present problems for legislative consideration.
The bare possibility that this license may produce other re-
sults, peculiar to the facts of this case, affords no basis suf-
ficiently certain to justify extension of the doctrine of misuse
beyond the established rule.
STATE LEGISLATION
REGULATION OF STRIP COAL MINING
I.
An Illinois statute' required the operator of strip coal
mines to level the spoil ridges to approximately the original
contour upon completion of mining operations. The statute
provided that the final cut could remain unfilled where the
adjacent spoil ridge was not sufficient to fill that cut.2 Cer-
tain coal mine operators3 sought to enjoin the Director of
Mines and Minerals from enforcing the act, alleging a denial
of due process and equal protection.4 The Illinois Supreme
1. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 93, §162.
2. "Any person ... engaged in 'open cut' ov 'strip' mining in which
the soil over or covering any bed or strata of coal is removed
shall spread such soil so that the contour of the land is approxi-
mately the same as before the mining operation was begun. Such
levelling operations shall be done progressively . . . so that no
more than three spoil ridges shall be left unlevelled . . . . When
the mining . . . is completed, the remaining spoil ridges shall
shall be levelled . . . provided, however, that the operator shall
not be required to totally fill the last open cut where the adjacent
spoil ridge will not fill such cut." Ibid.
3. Plaintiffs were owners of 30,000 acres of strip mine land and pro-
ducers of 95% of the total strip mined coal in Illinois.
4. The record indicates that plaintiffs invoked both the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the fol-
lowing provisions of the Illinois Constitution: Article II, § 2
("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law.") ; § 14 ("-No . . . law . . . making any
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Court affirmed the trial court's decree awarding an injunction
and held that the statute invaded the rights of property
under the guise of a police regulation and that it set up
an unreasonable classification.r Northern Illinois Coal Corp.
v. Medill, 72 N.E.2d 844 (Ill. 1947).
The case presents an old problem-the extent and pro-
priety of an investigation by the judiciary of the appropriate-
ness of legislative enactments-applied to a new field, conser-
vation legislation relating to strip mining. Assuming that
at the state level the doctrine of substantive due process still
has considerable force, we may examine its relation to this
particular type of conservation legislation.
In the Illinois case the court construed the statute in the
light of the State's contentions that the statute represented
a valid exercise of the police power as a health and conser-
vation measure. The argument that the statute was designed
to protect health by decreasing mosquito and bacteria breed-
ing ponds 6 was rejected ince the act did not require the
filling in of al pools of water. Pools of stagnant water are
a health menace, a fact of which courts might well take ju-
dicial notice,7 and a statute which decreased the number of
noxious pools could be reasonably related to the public health.
In addition the generall accepted rule is that the legislature
does not have to cure every possible evil in one statute.8
The contention that the statute was a valid conservation
irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities shall be
passed."); Article IV, § 22 ("The general assembly shall not
pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated
cases . . .Granting to any corporation, association or individual
any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever
... . In all other cases where a general law can be made ap-
plicable, no special law shall be enacted.").
5. At no point did the Supreme Court refer to specific constitutional
provisions upon which it based its decision, but since the only cases
cited in the opinion were Illinois cases, and since state courts
tend to rest constitutional decisions solely on their own consti-
tutions, it may be assumed that the court construed only the
Illinois constitution.
6. Unevelled, mined-over land collects numerous pools of water and
defendant argued that the statute decreased the number of
these pools and thereby lessened danger to public health.
7. In this connection, see the discussion of the recent Indiana case,
Dept. of Ins. v. Schoonover, 72 N.E.2d 747 (Ind. 1947), which
held that the determination of the validity of a statute involving
an exercise of the police power was a question of law, and only
those extrinsic facts are admissible of which a court will take
judicial notice. Note, 23 Ind. L. J. 176 (1948).
8. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924).
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measure was also rejected, the court disagreeing that the
statute evidenced a legislative determination that the chief
economic value of the land to be preserved was its value
as land capable of cultivation. This could not be the purpose
of the act because ".... the State ha no authority , under the
guise of a conservation theory, to compel a private owner, at
his own expense, to convert his property to what it considers
to be a higher or better use.",, [Italics supplied]. One may
ask how the purpose of a statute is to be determined, if an
attempt at conservation legislation, made in good faith, is
called a "guise." As an alternative the court held that even
if the act were a valid exercise of the police power it was
nevertheless fatally defective because there was no reason-
able ground for distinguishing strip mine operators on the
basis of the mineral produced. The court found that the
undesirable result from a health or conservation standpoint
occurred because of the method of mining employed, not the
nature of the product removed.
By using the doctrine of substantive due process the court
overruled the legislature's judgment as to the object of the
act, the appropriateness of the means selected, and the reas-
onableness of the classification employed. Thus an attempt
at health and conservation legislation failed.
II.
Considering the fate of the Illinois statute, are there
valid grounds for sustaining this kind of legislation, even
though the "presumptive validity"10 accorded these statutes
may be slight?
A statute to be valid must be reasonable in its classifica-
tion. Reasonable classification is variously and ambiguously
defined. It must be "natural," "rational," "germane to the
subject matter," etc., in short, it must be "reasonable." The
problem of classification, therefore, is not what is reasonable
but rather who is to determine what is reasonable. The test
in the United States Supreme Court of the "reasonable legis-
9. Northern Illinois Coal Corp. v. Medill, 72 N.E.2d 844, 847
(Ill. 1947).
10. ". . . in the exercise of the police power of a State it is for
the legislature to determine when the conditions exist calling for
the exercise of that power, and . . . when the legislature has
acted the presumption is that the act is a valid exercise of such
power." People v. Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 169, 118 N.E. 87, 90 (1917)("loan-shark" law held constitutional).
[Vol 23
lator" is given at least lip service by the states: "... . debatable
questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for
the legislature, which is entitled to form its own judgment,
and its action within its range of discretion cannot be set aside
because compliance is burdensome .... There is no constitu-
tional requirement that regulation must reach every class to
which it might be applied,-that the legislature must regulate
all or none."" When considering a statute similar to that
involved in the principal case, reasonable men might find
many reasons for distinguishing between kinds of strip mine
operators, justifying the regulation of coal mines only. The
following bases are suggestive: a greater acreage may be
involved in coal stripping; 12 types of soil affected by coal
stripping may differ from those in strip mining of other
minerals; costs may be more easily bourne by the coal in-
dustry than by other industries; other means of coal extrac-
tion may exist whereas gravel could be removed only by
stripping. Unless a court intends to mock the legislature's
policy judgment and substitute its own, the argument of
unreasonable classification will not defeat the statute.
But a statute must also avoid the pitfalls of the due pro-
cess requirement. Therefore a second ground for assailing
the statute's validity is that conservation legislation which
regulates the use of land is a denial of due process, i.e., the
attempted exercise of the police power is too broad and
constitutes a "taking." However it cannot be denied that the
state may prescribe certain activity in the use of one's land.
An example are statutes which regulate the owner's disposal
of slashings and debris from the cutting or manufacture of
timber on his land, in order to minimize the danger of forest
fires.23  Moreover, the state can compel an owner
11. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388, 296 (1932); quoted with ap-
proval by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Monroe, 349
Ill. 270, 289, 290, 182 N.E. 439, 447 (1932); accord, Tigner v.
Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940); Bolivar Twp. Bd. of Fin. v.
Hawkins, 207 Ind. 171, 183, 184, 191 N.E. 158, 162, 163, (1934).
12. Cf., "Report of the Strip Mining Study Commission to the Governor
and the 97th General Assembly of the State of Ohio," January 15,
1947 (unpublished) at 6: "The commission observed stripping
operations which involved minerals other than coal, but as there
had been no reclamation attempted and as the acreage involved was
small in comparison, the following facts and findings apply to
coal stripping only."
13, Minn. Stat. Ann. (Mason, Supp. 1938) § 4031-19.
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to use his land so as to avoid injuring the land of others14 (an
exercise of power particularly pertinent in view of the phys-
ical- and esthetic6 effects of strip mining on adjacent land).
In addition, it should be noted that limitations on the use of
property through zoning ordinances have been upheld as a
valid exercise of police power.17  If the state may greatly
decrease the value of private property and restrict its use
through an ordinance enacted for the general welfare, it is
arguable by analogy that the state may also regulate the use
of strip mined land. 8  Fihally, under ctrtain circumstances
an individual's interest may even be destroyed because of a
superior public interest.19 The foregoing analogies should
be persuasive to a court when considering the appropriateness
of the legislative means selected to accomplish the desired
object of conservation. Moreover, a court, when the validity
of a statutory regulation is brought before it, must recognize
the capacity of the legislature to determine appropriate meth-
14. The right to abate a nuisance, public or private, derives from
the state's power to protect the general welfare in this respect.
15. See, e.g., the Ohio Strip Mining Commission Report, supra n. 12,
at 10. The Commission found that "adjoining lands to strip
mining operations are affected by placing thereon spoil banks
and other refuse which makes an additional 20% in acreage to
the total acreage stripped directly affected by strip mining
operations." The inter-relation of vegetation and soil erosion sug-
gests yet another reason for regulation.
16. See 17 Ind. L.J. 172, 173 (1941).
17. Village of Euclid v. Ambler, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); accord, City
of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84, 149 N.E. 784 (1925); Board
of Commissioners v. Sanders, 218 Ind. 43, 30 N.E.2d 713 (1940).
18. Note, in this connection, the Indiana zoning ordinance which ap-
plies in part to strip mining areas. Zoning Ordinance No. 1, Board
of Commissioners, Daviess County (1946). And see, Ops. Att'y
Gen., Ind. (1946) No. 95.
19. " . . . where public interest in involved preferment of that interest
over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even
of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of
every exercise of the police power which affects property." Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279, 280 (1928) (see, infra, n. 25); cf.
State ex rel Mavity v. Tyndall, 74 N.E.2d 914, 916, 917 (Ind. 1947):
"Property or property rights may not be taken or destroyed
under the guise of the police power or of a police regulation,
unless the taking or destruction has a just relation to the protection
of the public health, welfare, morals or safety. Unless it affirm-
atively appears by the act, or the history of its enactment that
it has no such just relation, the police power extends even to
the taking and destruction of property. It will be presumed that
the act is reasonable, unless the contrary appears from facts of
which the courts will take notice." Contra: Penn. Coal Co. v
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), cf. Brandeis' dissent in this case,
p. 417: 'the right of the owner to use his land is not absolute .
uses, once harmless, may, owing to changed conditions, seriously
threaten the public welfare."
[Vol. 23
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ods. Where similar regulations have been upheld in the past
it would seem illogical for a court to declare present means
"unreasonable."
I.
With the growing realization that our natural resources
are not unlimited2o conservation legislation- has increased in
volume in the past thirty years. Concurrently the notion of
a "right" to unfettered exploitation has necessarily waned.
The power of a state to legislate to protect its resources is
not questioned, 22 and the theory sustaining such legislation
is that which lies behind any valid exercise of the police
power: the state, in the interest of the general health, safety,
welfare, and morals, may impose reasonable limitations on
rights of property and individual liberty in order to preserve
the general good.23 Generally, conservation measures attempt
to deal directly with the resources 'to be conserved. 24  Oc-
casionally however, the legislation regulates one resource in
20. For general discussions, see Gustafson, "Conservation in the
United States" (1944); Wilbur, "Conservation in the Department
of the Interior" (U.S. Gov't Prn't Off. 1931).
21. Typical enactments are state model district soil conservation acts,
drainage district acts, forestry conservation acts, etc. See, State
Law Index (1925-1944); "State Planning, A Review of Activities
and Progress" National Resources Board (U.S. Gov't Prn't Off.
1935). For a discussion of federal constitutional limitations on
state conservation legislation, see, Rosenson, "The Power of a State
over its Natural Resources" 17 Tulane L.Rev. 256 (1942-43).
22. See, Williams, "Conservation of Mineral Resources: A Brief
Survey" 47 W.Va.L.Q. 247 (1940-41). The state's power extends
even to the protection and preservation of fossils. See note,
"Statutory Restrictions on the Collection of Fossils" 45 Col. L.
Rev. 634 (1945).
23. ". .. no community confines its care of the public welfare to the
enforcement of the principles of the common law.., it [the state)
exercises its compulsory powers for the prevention and anticipa-
tion of wrong by narrowing common law rights through con-
ventional restraints and positive regulations which are not con-
fined to the prohibition of wrongful acts. It is this latter kind of
state control which constitutes the essence of the police power.
The maxim of this power is that every individual must submit
to such restraints in the exercise of his liberty or of his rights of
property as may be required to remove or reduce the danger of
the abuse of these rights on the part of those who are unskillful,
careless or unscrupulous." Freund, "Police Power" § 8 (1904).
24. E.g., statutes regulating the drilling of oil fields. For a dis-
cussion of statutory regulation in this field see Marshall and
Meyers, "Legal Planning of Petroleum Production" 41 Yale L.J.
33 (1931-32); Summers, "The Modem Theory and Practical
Application of Statutes for the Conservation Qf Oil and Gas" 13
Tulane L.Rev. 1 (1938).
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order to conserve another.25  Statutes regulating the strip
mining of coal are of the second type. Because of the nature
of the strip mining method of coal extraction many acres of
land are laid waste26 and, in order to remedy this depletion
of soil and vegetation, legislatures have imposed statutory
reclamation duties on the mine operator. Six states27 engage
in 85% of the total coal production 2 8 and in these states
coal is mined by both the underground or shaft method, and
by the surface or strip method.29 Five of these states have
enacted strip coal mining regulatory statutes in the past ten
years. These statutes, while similar, vary in some details.
In 1941, Indiana passed a statute- applying to coal strip
mine operators which requires them to plant seeds or cuttings
of trees and shrubs in a manner approved by the Department
of Conservation. The statute does not require the operator
to level the land, and it applies only to those operators who
mine more than 250 tons yearly.3
25. The'constiutionality of two such statutes was determined in: Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (diseased cedar trees destroyed
in order to protect apple trees); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S.
190 (1900) (oil extraction regulated to conserve natural gas sup-
plies).
26. In strip mining the surface layer of earth covering the coal
seasn is removed, and piled in a bank, or "spoil ridge" on land
adjacent to the first "cut." The excavation proceeds in parallel
lines, the spoil ridge of the second cut being placed in the trench
left by the first cut, etc. When the mining is completed the land
lies in a series of long humps and depressions, barren of vegeta-
tion and unsuitable for agriculture. For a factual description
see the Report of the Ohio Strip Mining Commission, supra n. 12.
27. Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia. Of
the six states only Kentucky is without a similar statute. See the
editorial urging adoption of a statute, Louisville Courier-Journal,
January 25, 1948, §3, p.2, col. 2.
28. Total coal production in the U.S. in 1944 (in millions of net tons):
683.3. Bituminous coal and lignite produced by leading states: III.,
76.8; Ind., 28.0; Ky., 71.3; Ohio, 33.9; Pa., 146.0; W.Va., 164.6.
Anthracite coal produced: Pa., 63.6. Total by states: 584.2.
Percentage of whole: 85.5. Source: Minerals Yearbook 861(U.S. Dep't. Int. 1945).
29. Bituminous coal and lignite in the U.S. mined underground and
from strip pits in 1944 (in millions of net tons): Ill., underground,
58.8, stripping, 18.0; Ind., underground, 13.9, stripping, 14.1; Ky.,
underground, 66.1, stripping, 5.2; Ohio, underground, 22.2, strip-
ping, 11.7; Pa., underground, 123.5, stripping, 22.5; W.Va., under-
ground, 151.8, stripping, 12.8. Source: Minerals Yearbook 885
(U.S. Dep't Int. 1945). Pennsylvania anthracite: underground,
52.7, stripping, 10.9. Id. at 918.
30. Ind. Acts 1941, c. 68, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) §§
46-1501 to 1515.
31. It should be noted that this feature presents an even narrower
ground of classification than did the Illinois statute. Nevertheless,
[Vol. 23
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The West Virginia statute,2 enacted in 1939, requires
that planting be done under the supervision of a state agency,
but exempts non-agricultural land. The non-exempt land
must be filled in, re-graded, and drained, and debris must be
removed. The operator may maintain areas for drift-mining
and haulage ways if he so desires.
The provisions of the Pennsylvania statute,33 passed in
1945, like those of the West Virginia statute, require revegeta-
tion under the guidance of a state agency, and permit the
maintenance of areas for drift-mining and haulage ways. The
ground must be leveled to the extent that the required plant-
ing can be done. The act applies only to those operators who
mine more than 250 tons yearly.
The Ohio statute of 1947, 34 did not take effect until
January 1, 1948. It too requires supervised revegetation, al-
lows areas for drift-mining and haulage ways, and applies
only to producers of more than 250 tons yearly. It requires
the spoil ridges to be levelled to a minimum width of fifteen
feet cross section.
These variations indicate a difference of legislative opin-
ion as to what is factually necessary in an effective conser-
vation measure, but the statutes are unanimous in recogniz-
ing the need for legislative control to ameliorate the destruct-
iveness of strip mining. This legislative determination is
apparent, not only from the provisions of the statutes, but
by their accompanying preambles.3 5 The Indiana preamble,
for example, states that the re-seeding is to aid in the pro-
tection of wild life, to enhance the value of land for taxation,
to decrease soil erosion, the hazard of floods, the pollution of
exemption of producers of less than 250 tons may have a rational
basis-for example, problems of administration. See 17 Ind. L. J.
172, 173 (1941).
32. W.Va. Acts 1939, c. 84. The statute was repealed and the Code
amended by insertion of a similar but more detailed regulation
in 1945 (W.Va. Acts 1945, c. 85).
33. Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1946) tit. 52, § 1396.1.
34. Ohio Acts 1947 (House Bill 314).
35. While a preamble cannot extend or restrain the meaning of an
act unambiguous on its face, it nevertheless is useful in indicating
legislative policy, especially when the legislation attempts to
regulate a new field where the scope and purpose of the act may
not be known. See 2 Sutherland, "Statutory Interpretation" §§
4804 to 4809 (3d. ed., Horack's, 1943).
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lakces and streams, and generally to restore the use and enjoy-
ment of the lands.3 6
None of these statutes has been held invalid3 7 and if a
court should find one unconstitutional it would seem to be a
clear, invasion of the legislative function, under the color of
substantive due process.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CONSIDERATION OF FACTS IN DUE PROCESS CASES
In Department of Insurance v. Schoonover, 72 N.E.2d
747 (Ind. 1947), a provision of the Indiana Insurance Law of
1935,1 which restricted the selling of fire and casualty in-
surance in Indiana to agents employed on a commission basis
only, was declared unconstitutional. Schoonover, an agent
employed on salary, was refused a license to sell insurance
by the Department of Insurance. He brought an action seek-
ing to enjoin the Department from limiting the issuance of
licenses for fire and casualty insurance to agents employed
solely on a commission basis.2 He contended that the statute
deprived him of his right to work or such terms as he might
freely secure; that the statute made a discriminatory classifi-
cation between salaried and commission agents; and that it
therefore violated the due process3 and equal protection' pro-
visions of the Indiana Constitution and the Fourteenth
36. Ind. Acts 1941, c. 68, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Supp. 1945) § 46-
1501. Cf., Ops. Att'y Gen., Ind. (1943) p. 301: "The real purpose
of the statute is not so much to encourage strip mining, but to
make sure that on land where strip ipining had already been done
the Conservation Commission would see to it that the land
would be restored to usefulness again and reforested."
37. Neither the Indiana nor the West Virginia statutes have been
challenged. The Ohio statute was not efective until 1948. The
Pennsylvania statute was held constitutional as a valid classifica-
tion and not a denial of due process, in Dufour v, Maize, -A.2d-
(Pa. January 19, 1948).
1. Ind. Acts 1935, c. 162, § 209(a), Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, Repl.
1940) § 39-4501 (a).
2. The Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., which had previously em-
ployed agents on salary in Indiana, was joined as party plaintiff.
The Indiana Association of Insurance Agents, an association of
agents on commission (comprising about 85 per cent of the insur-
ance agents in the state), were joined as party defendants and
for all practical purposes defended the action; the Attorney Gen-
eral joined in all motions, etc., for the purpose of getting a de-
termination of the cause.
3. Ind. Const. Art. I, § 1.
4, Ind, Const, Art. I § 23,
